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Tocqueville' s New Science of Energy 
Ben Berger 
Harvey C. Mansfield's Manliness generates conversation, controversy, and re­
flection-the first two among the reading public, the third among his recent 
students. 1 Although my cohort entered graduate school years before Mans­
field began his manly project, his interests and emphases subtly influenced 
our own. However, many of us chose kindred subjects-honor, thumos, love 
of fame, moral courage, and, in my case, energy-without identifying them 
as specifically masculine.2 In this essay I will illuminate the role of energy 
in Alexis de Tocqueville's political thought, energy that can be found in 
both sexes. 3 Tocqueville's "new political science" cultivates citizens' energy, 
courage, and resolve, traits that Tocqueville sometimes (but not always) as­
sociates with men, yet it channels and limits them with humanity, judg­
ment, and moral restraint, qualities that Tocqueville often associates with 
women. Part masculine and part feminine, Tocqueville's new political sci­
ence embodies a "metrosexual manliness" for the modern era. 
I use the term "metrosexual" with humor but sincerity as well, and for 
two reasons.4 First, it fits: as I have noted, Tocqueville's "new political sci­
ence" combines elements that Tocqueville calls masculine and feminine, 
and that combination is exactly what metrosexuality addresses.5 Second, 
even faddish and silly terms can contain a grain of genuine insight if exam­
ined in the proper light. The insight in this case? Human traits and virtues 
can be less gender-specific than some traditionalists have supposed. Thus I 
employ "metrosexual" to tweak good-naturedly the exclusive identification 
of courage, thumos, and energy with manliness. Tocqueville himself makes 
those identifications, but in the end he cares less that democracy feature 
manly men than that it contain energetic citizens, regardless of who pro­
vides the juice.6 Energetic women can contribute to the supply without 
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being labeled "manly women," a backhanded compliment if ever there was 
one.
For an example of energy's gender-neutrality, consider Lady Macbeth's in­
famous soliloquy:
Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here.
And fill me from the aown to the toe top-full 
Of direst cruelty! make thick my blood;
Stop up the access and passage to remorse.
That no compunctious visitings of nature 
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between 
The effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts.
And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers,
V^erever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature's mischief! Come, thick night.
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark.
To cry "Hold, hold!"^
At first glance, Shakespeare seems to imply that masculinity accomplishes 
difficult deeds but lacks the remorse and moral thoughtfulness that might 
stay one's hand from evil. Femininity apparently shrinks from cruelty by na­
ture and complicates immoral boldness through compunction. But closer 
examination reveals a different picture. Lady Macbeth asks not to be re- 
sexed but unsexed, not for more manliness but less womanliness. She al­
ready exceeds her mate in energy, resolve, and ambition; now she desires 
less womanly humanity and fewer scruples. Energy can be masculine or 
feminine, but energy without restraint is unsexed—neither manly nor 
womanly, suitable for only a beast or a god.
Edmund Spenser's Faerie Queene contrasts Lady Macbeth's energetic vil­
lainy with a more balanced heroine. Spenser's maiden knight Britomart 
combines energy, courage, and physical prowess with judgment, temper­
ance, and humanity. She exceeds other knights in strength and courage, un­
seating Sir Guyon in a joust and walking through fire while her male con­
sort holds back. But Britomart also exemplifies the virtues of chastity and 
loyalty, and has the moderation to check her energies when appropriate. 
During a daring, attempted rescue she encounters and heeds a mysterious 
warning that prefigures Tocqueville's counsel to democracy: "Be bold, be 
bold ... be not too bold."® Indeed, the maiden Britomart embodies one of 
the most important ingredients in Tocqueville's new political science, 
namely dynamic energy that is harnessed for worthy projects yet limited by 
moral perspective and propriety.
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I do not intend to debate the masculinity or femininity of any particular 
trait, nor 'to make man and woman into beings not only equal, but alike" 
(for which Tocqueville himself rebukes his fellow Europeans) (DA, 573). In 
other words I am not claiming that all citizens should possess both male 
and female traits and virtues. 1 am interested simply in identifying those 
traits that make democracy work, regardless of the sex that engenders them. 
Citizens' energies, for Tocqueville, comprise one of democracy's most vital 
resources. Energetic democracies might not always succeed, but enervated 
democracies—the citizenry completely dependent upon its government 
and "fear[ing] it will die if it makes an effort"—are sure to end badly. In 
stressing that point Tocqueville articulates a concern of long standing in the 
political theory tradition. Philosophers from Plato to William James have 
regretted democracy's potential to go soft, to sacrifice martial discipline for 
fur coats and the fatted calf. The worry is that toughness, discipline, and en­
ergy may bring about commercial success that undermines the very traits 
and virtues that made it possible. Warriors become merchants become 
sybarites, eventually falling prey to any disciplined, energetic enemies who 
raise their fists. Free regimes, in which citizens can enjoy the fruits of their 
energies, require active measures (and a new political science) to prevent 
their dissipation while tempering their excesses.
Public affairs will never attract citizens' energies enduringly if they do not 
first attract and hold citizens' attention, so Tocqueville focuses on both of 
those resources, namely energy and attention. A third resource fills out the 
Tocquevillean triumvirate: long-term perspective, or what the first President 
Bush once dismissed as "the vision thing." Citizens need but often lack 
clear perspective on their own long-term interests, which include a sus­
tained investment of attention and energy in the occasionally unappealing 
business of self-government. Perspective, attention, and energy occupy a far 
greater portion of Tocqueville's "new political science" than most readers 
have supposed. Tocqueville's new political engineering might be an equally 
appropriate description, because he aims to pool, channel, and limit citi­
zens' energies through the use of various tools: institutional design, civic 
education, moral suasion, and other appeals to citizens' attention, some of 
which he identifies with feminine virtues rather than masculine mastery.
Too often, contemporary scholars treat Tocqueville as if he were an un­
qualified enthusiast for democracy in America, overlooking his stem inti­
mations that our success at self-government might be a passing phase.^ At 
the very outset of Democracy in America Tocqueville sets the tone for his 
project by worrying about French democracy's warped political perspective, 
inadequate political attention, and insufficient political energy. Each citizen 
"loses sight of the very object of his pursuits," gives "the least attention" to 
understanding democracy's needs, and lacks "the courage and energy" to 
preserve democratic freedom (DA, 10). In the rest of his magisterial work
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Tocqueville elaborates on the conneaions between perspective, attention, 
energy, and sustainable freedom. When political attention disperses, when 
political energy wanes, and when political perspective gives way to short­
sighted individualism, meaningful self-government faces an uncertain fu­
ture. New England circa 1830 might have put France to shame vis-a-vis self- 
government, but American democracy too contained the seeds of 
disengagement.
Tocqueville identifies both the innate impulses and the environmental 
factors that impel people toward self-enclosure and the voluntary removal 
of their energies from collective projects, focusing on four primary factors: 
equality, materialism, individualism, and isolation.'® The latter two are in­
timately related and, when taken together, resemble what we now call so­
cial and political disengagement. Equality and materialism can promote 
that disengagement, so they join individualism and isolation in threatening 
to undermine jjolitical perspective, disperse political attention, and absorb 
political energy in private pursuits. As political engagement declines—as 
citizens withdraw their attention and energy from self-government in order 
to focus on materialistic projects—they may appoint a third party to over­
see their common affairs. The results are governmental and administrative 
centralization that may undermine democratic liberty. Hence, Tocqueville's 
"principal goal in writing this book has been to combat" the forces im­
pelling democracy toward the related perils of civilian atomization and gov­
ernmental centralization." To be clear, these perils do not stem from abu­
sive government, predatory big business, or foreign adversaries; they arise 
from within the citizen body. Citizens' own judgments and actions are 
largely to blame because their perspective, attention, and energy are limited 
and sometimes poorly invested. Nonetheless, combating disengagement is 
not a matter of the government compelling citizens to participate in public 
life. Attention and energy cannot be coerced or they lose their spontaneity 
and power. Democratic government must try to elicit political energy and 
attention with a soft touch, through persuasion, education, and induce­
ment, and then channel and limit those resources responsibly, rather than 
attempt the kind of excessively macho and self-defeating coercion that 
"without perceiving it, drives away the object of its covetousness."'^
ENERGY
Throughout Democracy in America Tocqueville refers to energy {energie) fifty 
times, giving astonishing prominence to a term more commonly found in 
physics texts than in political philosophy.Tocqueville's energy describes 
the motive force behind aaion, the ^el for achievement of any human 
ends. Energy undergirds individual and collective action, part psychological
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and part physiological. Thus energy encompasses Aristotle's distinctions be­
tween dunamis, kinesis, and energeia—human potential, aaivity, and aaual- 
ization—which are rooted in the human psyche as well as the biological 
world. Energy signifies much more than mere desire, which, lacking mo­
tive force behind it, cannot accomplish anything of value. Consider Toc- 
quevilie's complaint about his homeland:
Each (Frenchman] feels the ill, but no one has the courage and energy needed to
seek something better; like the passions of old men that end only in impotence,
desires, regrets, sorrows and joys produce nothing visible or lasting. (DA, 10)
Tocqueville repeatedly claims that desire alone, without the courage, energy, 
or power for actualization, leaves one's goals unfulfilled. When comment­
ing on the scarcity of great learning in democracies, Tocqueville observes 
that "the will to engage in these works is lacking as much as is the power" 
(DA, 51). Effective work requires not only the will to choose an objea but 
the energy or power to get the job done.
Is energy manly? Yes and no. By separating desire from energy Toc­
queville invokes Plato's division between eras, which chooses an object for 
pursuit, and thumos, which can affirm or reject the choice. Indeed, Toc- 
queville's energy is akin to thumos, and Tocqueville occasionally associates 
it with manly virility and indomitability. Energy exists to be actualized, and 
energetic characters hate illegitimate constraint or arbitrary rule. Thus Toc­
queville often places energy alongside thumos's corollaries, courage and love 
of freedom.*'’ Tocqueville criticizes French aristocrats for their debauched 
cruelty but praises their energy, their "pride of heart," and the "manly 
mores" that make them "the most resistant part of the social body."*^ Sim­
ilarly, Tocqueville honors the early Native Americans as a quasi-aristocratic 
race possessing "the energy of barbarism," a "proud soul," "courage," and 
an "intractable love of independence."*® Energy without courage often fal­
ters, as Tocqueville observed among his European contemporaries. In 
France "society is tranquil ... it fears it will die if it makes an effort" (DA, 
10). And in Germany Tocqueville regrets the disappearance of "the activity, 
the energy, the communal patriotism, the fertile and manly virtues" that 
had once been inspired by medieval laws.*^ But Tocqueville also praises 
American women, "who often display a manly reason and a wholly virile 
energy" while not being "manly" women. For all their energy they "gener­
ally preserve a very delicate appearance and always remain women in their 
manners. . . Energy might mark American men more vividly but char­
acterizes American women as well.
Governments as well as individuals require energy to aa swiftly and ef­
fectively, to execute their goals and defend their independence. As the peo­
ple are democracy's ruling element, the institutions of government are es­
sentially tools or mechanisms for achieving the people's collective ends and
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the public good. Like all mechanisms they require inputs of energy in order 
to function. Indeed, throughout his political works Tocqueville draws upon 
mechanistic metaphors to hammer home the importance of institutions fu­
eled by citizens' collective energy. In New England townships "everything 
moves around you and nowhere do you discover the motor. The hand that 
directs the social machine vanishes at each instant" (DA, 67). In the Old 
Regime, Tocqueville insists that the "greamess and power of a people" can­
not be adduced to "the mechanism of its laws alone; for, in this matter, it is 
less the perfection of the instrument than the strength of the motors that 
determines the result" (OR, 221). Collective energy is the fuel that facilitates 
society's activity, supplies the "motive force" and tends the "strength of [its] 
motors."^'
Motive force and activity, in turn, are closely associated with freedom it­
self Consider the well-known passage in which Tocqueville inveighs 
against administrative centralization:
What does it matter to me, after all, that there should be an authority always 
on its feel, keeping watch that my pleasures are tranquil, flying ahead of my 
steps to turn away every danger without my even needing to think about it, if 
this authority, at the same that it removes the least thorns on my path, is ab­
solute master of my freedom and my life, if it monopolizes movement and ex­
istence to such a point that everything around it must languish when it lan­
guishes, that everything must sleep when its sleeps, that everything must perish 
if it dies? (DA, 88)
"Freedom" and "life" should be read as a pair, alongside "movement" and 
"existence." When government is the master of the first pair, it monopolizes 
the second. Thus, life parallels existence—a rather obvious equation—but 
also, more provocatively, freedom parallels movement.
In his chapter on the ubiquity of energetic activity throughout the United 
States Tocqueville contrasts free and non-free countries in terms of their ac­
tivity. In free countries, "all is activity and movement; here [in France], all 
seems calm and immobile" (DA, 231). In his eyes, "the greatest advantage 
of democratic government" may be the "agitation, constantly reborn," in­
troduced by democratic government and carried into civil society (DA, 
233). Because energy and activity are the engines of self-government's in­
dependence, political science—"that great science of government"—must 
teach "how to understand the general movement of society" (OR, 199).
While energy is a capacity residing in every individual, it functions best 
when utilized collectively. Energetic individuals face overwhelming odds 
when they act by themselves, as shown by the case of the failed reformer: 
"He exhausts himself in the wish to animate this indifferent and distraaed 
crowd, and finally he sees himself reduced to powerlessness, not because he 
is defeated, but because he is alone" (DA, 610). To be enduringly success­
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ful, collective energy must be voluntary as well, for "{o]ne will never en­
counter . . . genuine power among men except in the free concurrence of 
wills" (DA, 89). Tocqueville often contrasts the efficacy of freely combined 
energies with the futility of coercion. When a centralized, despotic govern­
ment forces people to work toward imposed goals it courts disaster, because 
it is not under such conditions that one obtains the concurrence of the hu­
man will* necessary to produce "genuine power." Slavery, the ultimate co­
ercion of energy and effort, is not only unjust but inefficient: "masters make 
slaves work without being obliged to pay them, but they receive little fruit 
from their efforts, while the money that they would give to free workers 
would be recovered with interest from the value of their labors. "22 Thus, 
while isolated or coerced individuals are immobile and ineffeaive, a soci­
ety of energetic individuals working in overlapping projects generates an 
important store of power (even if it falls short of aristocratic greatness). That 
power makes possible impressive, collective efforts as well as a viable, com­
mon defense against the encroaching power of domestic governments and 
foreign threats.
Tocqueville's emphasis on collective energy prefigures Hannah Arendi's in­
sistence on the cooperative nature of power.23 For both Tocqueville and 
Arendt, energy and power must be used or risk atrophy. Should demoaatic 
citizens abandon their collective, energetic pursuits, they abandon their pri­
mary resource for resisting despotism's sway. While the relentless aaivity pro­
duced by widespread liberty may seem frightening or exhausting, citizens 
should not yield to the temptation to withdraw from public life. "I know that 
in our day there are many honest people... who, fatigued by freedom, would 
like to rest at last far from its storms," Tocqueville says, but "they know very 
poorly the port toward which they direa themselves" (DA, 298-99).
Enei^ must reside in any regime's ruling element. Thus, healthy aristoc­
racies must have an energetic nobility; healthy democracies need an ener­
getic citizenry. The nobility's tastes, loves, and habits decide the goals to­
ward which aristocracies direct their collective energies; in democracies, 
popular tastes (and social conditions) diaate the same. Aristocracies, 
moved by what Tocqueville considers to be "great" loves, can "act strongly 
on all [other nations] . . . attempt great undertakings and . . . great actions.
. . ." (DA, 234-35). The resulting rewards, however, are distributed in­
equitably: "The capital vice for which aristocracy is reproached is that of 
working only for itself, and not for the mass" (DA, 219). Conversely, one of 
the "true advantages" of democracy is that "it spreads a restive activity 
through the whole social body, a superabundant force, an energy that never 
exists without it, and which ... can bring forth marvels" (DA, 234). The de­
mocratization of energy results in greater overall prosperity but also lower 
goals, because of democracy's prosaic tastes. Nonetheless, while democ­
racy s goals and achievements may not be as impressive, Tocqueville praises
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democraqr less for its outcomes than for its processes—the continual mo­
tion evoked by democratic institutions and continued throughout civil 
society—that he believes essential to sustaining widespread freedom.
While the people are democracy's ruling element, Tocqueville realizes 
that in modern democracies citizens must delegate a share of their power to 
a centralized government.^** To govern justly and well, central government 
requires energy and firmness. As Madison writes in Federalist 37, "Energy in 
government is essential to that security against external and internal danger, 
and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the 
very definition of good government. Tocqueville cites the Federalist ap­
provingly, never disagreeing on the importance of governmental energy, but 
he emphasizes a complementary point. Madison, writing during a period of 
unstable, ineffective government, tries to ensure sufficient energy for the 
Union. Tocqu^ille, with fifty years' hindsight, insists that energetic govern­
ment must be balanced by equal energy in the citizenry. Thus, while all of 
the Federalist's (thirty-one) references to political energy concern the energy 
of government, all but one of Democracy in America's references to political 
energy concern the energy of the people.^^
Too often, political science scholarship focuses on policy proposals and 
government initiatives as if government itself were the regime's ruling ele­
ment. Tocqueville's insights are a reminder that democracy's ruling element 
must always be the people, and if their energy departs, so does democracy. 
Even though he lacks the twentieth-century term "bureaucracy," Tocqueville 
recognizes that concept as the logical and regrettable outcome should cen­
tralized administration ever monopolize political enei^. Tocqueville asso­
ciates bureaucratic monopoly with the end of meaningful democracy and a 
likely step toward harsh or soft despotism.^^
Tocqueville frequently uses the metaphors of water and molecules to en­
hance his descriptions of human relations.^® When molecules are too far 
apart, their energy can dissipate or evaporate; when they are too dose to­
gether, they are frozen and immobile. In Tocqueville's words, "despotism 
. . . walls [citizens] up inside their private lives. They already tend to keep 
themselves apart from one another: despotism isolates them; it chills their 
relations; it freezes them" (OR, 87). Individuals and their political energy 
require proper proximity to one another—neither the "iron bands" of des­
potism nor the atomization of mass society.^^ Even with the proper distance 
between its sources, energy must also be channeled effectively. Otherwise, 
collected energy could flow in many directions and thus deplete its poten­
tial, or could flood all at once and cause great damage. Consider Toc­
queville's choice of metaphors: "municipal bodies and the administrations 
of counties therefore form so many hidden shoals that delay or divide the 
flood of the popular will," and political associations are a "dike against 
tyranny" of the majority or of an oppressive faction (DA, 250, 192). The
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same metaphor holds regarding governmental energy. In France, Toc- 
queville sa>^, an inefficient system of public employment "was like an ir­
regular and badly constructed dike which divided the central power's 
strength and dissipated its shock" (OK, 172). If the colleaive energies are 
limited and channeled toward representative institutions that allow them 
expression, they can be harnessed toward useful projects and sometimes 
even great ones.
If energy is such a vital component of political and economic success, 
why must we limit it? Just as freedom must be circumscribed to be enjoyed 
in the long term—if all people do exactly as they like, anarchy looms on the 
horizon—the people's colleaive energy must be limited and channeled. 
Otherwise, colleaed energy tends toward entropy. Energy that is not pooled 
and direaed can stagnate or wither, just as energy that is pooled but not 
limited can rage out of control and end in anarchy. Tocqueville observes 
both these conditions in France before the Revolution:
... the progress of government often slowed and sometimes stopped: public
life was as suspended. At other times, it was by excess of aaivity and self-con­
fidence that the new governments sinned .. . wanting to make everything bet­
ter. they ended up confusing everything. (OR, 237)
Thus colleaive energy must not only be channeled toward useful projeas 
but kept within appropriate limits. The most important of these limiting in­
fluences include laws and political institutions, "habits of the heart" (cus­
toms and mores), and one of the most important influences, organized re­
ligion.Tocqueville observed American men investing their energies in the 
business of commerce and politics, with women investing theirs in the 
maintenance of morality and order. He was so impressed with this com­
plementary pairing that he ascribed "the chief cause of the extraordinary 
prosperity and growing power of this nation" to "the superiority of the 
women" over their European counterparts.
Religion can restrain people's aaions within a bounded moral universe 
and, perhaps more importantly, "impose a salutary control on the intel- 
lea." Absolute freedom to invest enei^ and attention can be worrisome or 
even maddening. In both religion and politics, "men are soon frightened by 
the limitless independence with which they are faced." In Tocqueville's view 
(to which Durkheim would later assent), freely accepted limitations on 
thought and aaion make meaningful freedom a possibility in the first 
place.^' Faced with an endless riot of possibilities, energy would soon dissi­
pate. As he puts it, "Such a state cannot fail to enervate souls; it slackens the 
springs of the will and prepares citizens for servitude" (DA, 418). But while 
Tocqueville credits religion for bolstering Americans' mores and hence con­
fining their energies to responsible and relatively ethical pursuits, he knows 
that religion itself cannot do the job. Here Tocqueville once again gives
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women and femininity pride of place, a necessary complement to, and re­
straint of, masculine energy and boldness:
Religion [in the U.S.] is often powerless to restrain man in the midst of the in­
numerable temptations that fortune presents to him. It cannot moderate the 
ardor in him for enriching himself, which everything comes to excite, but it 
reigns as a sovereign over the soul of women, and it is woman who makes 
mores. (DA, 278-79)
To Tocqueville, femininity involves neither obeisance nor subservience but 
a healthy acceptance of appropriate limitations. So far from being mere fol­
lowers by nature, women can accept moral limitations and also lead their 
restless men to compliance.^^ In this sense they embody Aristotle's concep­
tion of the citizen, being ruled (by religious mores) and ruling (over their 
constantly tempted husbands) in tum.^^ Thus America's moral and politi­
cal landscapes are marked by restless and productive energies as well as 
salutary limitations and order:
. . . everything is certain and fixed in the moral world, although the political 
world seems to be abandoned to the discussion and attempts of men. So the hu­
man spirit never perceives an unlimited field before itself: however bold it may 
be, from time to time it feels that it ought to halt before insurmountable barri­
ers. Before innovating, it is forced to accept certain primary givens and to sub­
mit its boldest conceptions to certain forms that delay and halt it. (DA, 279)
Tocqueville would have it no other way; if a democracy were not both en­
ergetic and limited in the American manner, its leaders would have to find 
other ways of making it so. Late in volume two Tocqueville reiterates, "One 
must try to pose the farthest boundaries for [ambition] in advance that it 
will never be permitted to cross; but one ought to guard against hindering 
its ascent too much within the permitted limits" (DA, 604). Combining 
masculine energy and feminine respect for limitations (as well as the femi­
nine energy needed to enforce moral restraint), the America that Toc­
queville commends indeed recalls Spenser's counsel to Britomart: "be bold, 
be bold ... be not too bold."
Tempering boldness with judgment requires not only the respect for lim­
itations that religious observance can reinforce, but also a long-term per­
spective on the well-being of the individual and the community, a trait that 
Tocqueville links more closely with women than with men.
PERSPECTIVE
Among its several roles. Democracy in America is a meditation on vision. 
Throughout that work (and also in the Old Regime) Tocqueville draws on
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metaphors of clear and far-reaching vision, and contrasting imagery of 
blindness and obfuscation.^-^ in Democracy in America he proposes "to see 
not differently but further," and in the Old Regime he desires "to see into the 
heart of the old regime, so close to us in years, but hidden from us by the 
Revolution" (OR, Preface, 84). Further, on more than a dozen occasions in 
Democracy in America Tocqueville distinguishes what is apparent "at first 
glance" ("au premier coup d'oeil") and what turns out to be true upon "more 
attentive examination" (DA, 70, 416). Those choices underscore Toc- 
queville's deep concern with democracy's long-term perspective and the fac­
tors that habitually cloud its sight.
Every legitimate regime requires a long-term perspective on the goals it 
can sustain and the means necessary to achieve them. Aristocracy, in spite 
of its many shortcomings, is well equipped for clear vision. At its best, aris­
tocracy can set glorious, far-reaching goals, form the sound judgment nec­
essary to pursue them, and achieve fruition by overcoming short-term de­
sires. Government by nobility, "master of itself... is not subjea to getting 
carried away in passing distractions; it has long designs that it knows how 
to ripen until a favorable occasion presents itself" (DA, 222).^5 For all de­
mocracy's advantages over aristocracy—most notably, its greater justice— 
long-term perspective frequently eludes its grasp. Tocqueville notes that "it 
is this clear perception of the future, founded on enlightenment and expe­
rience, that democracy will often lack" (DA, 214).36 Why should this be the 
case? Citizens have a difficult time judging appropriate long-term goals for 
their society because their materialistic desires direct them toward present 
satisfactions, and because the immediacy of those desires undermines the 
deep reflection required of good judgment. As Tocqueville laments, "In cen­
turies in which almost everyone acts, one is therefore generally brought to 
attach an excessive value to rapid sparks and superficial conceptions of the 
intellea and, on the contrary, to depreciate immoderately its profound, 
slow work" (DA, 435). Further, most people "see less clearly than the upper 
classes what they can hope or fear from the future," in part because democ­
racies lack a class of life-long statesmen, imbued with a respea for past and 
future generations (DA, 214). Thus, most citizens lack the aristocratic elites' 
experience with public affairs. Not only that, but democracy's "natural in­
stincts"—its love of equality and mistrust of superiority—"bring the people 
to keep distinguished men away from power" (DA, 189). For their part, 
these distinguished figures often shun public office, either to avoid its fre­
quent tawdriness or to pursue greater fortunes in private life.
Despite these obstacles, democracy must develop and sustain some kind 
of clear perspective on its long-term interests, its achievable desires, and the 
appropriate relationship of citizens to one another.^^ Tocqueville calls this 
the "doctrine of self-interest well understood." Note: "well" understood, 
not "best" understood. Less rigorous than Aristotle's virtue of practical wisdom
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{phronisis), which evaluates virtuous ends and the means to achieve 
them, self-interest well understood—which I identify with democratic 
"perspective"—takes the people's ends as given and evaluates the means 
to achieve them imperfectly but enduringly. Self-interest well understood 
is "general theory" that helps Americans "to combine their own well-be­
ing with that of their fellow citizens" (DA, 501). It dictates that individ­
uals pay attention to and aa in accordance with those norms "appropri­
ate to the times," which include toleration, reciprocity, cooperation, and 
interpersonal trust. It tells citizens that they must help each other in or­
der to accomplish their own ends, even if they find cooperation tem­
porarily unpleasant.
As Tocqueville describes it, "enlightened self-love continually leads them 
to help one another and disposes them freely to give part of their time and 
wealth for fhe good of the state." Tocqueville endorses self-interest well un­
derstood as a flawed but undeniably useful asset that is the best moral doc­
trine available to most people.^® The doctrine of self-interest well under­
stood and its corollary norms are democratic virtues because, while they do 
not diaate phenomenal sacrifices or individual excellence, they are accessi­
ble and appealing to all. In their absence—should citizens no longer be 
touched or moved by "those great and powerful public emotions" that can 
motivate communal undertakings or the mingling of self-interest with the 
commonweal—self-government and democratic freedom would be jeop­
ardized (DA, 616).
Tocqueville claims that among Americans the doctrine of self-interest 
well understood had "come to be universally accepted," but acceptance 
does not equal active emulation; it may mean that people pay attention to 
social and moral norms without an energetic follow-throu^ (DA, 526). 
Tocqueville's observations imply that a citizenry steered by self-interest well 
understood is more of an ideal than an empirical observation.®^ In practice, 
long-term vision often falters:
Do not say to men that in giving themselves over so blindly to an exclusive pas­
sion, they compromise their dearest interests; they are deaf. Do not show them 
that freedom escapes from their hands while they are looking elsewhere; they 
are blind, or rather they perceive only one good in the whole universe worth 
longing for (DA, 481).'*°
In other words, it must be hoped but cannot be guaranteed that the people 
will have a taste for what they truly need. We might hope that reason or cal­
culation will inform or shape desire, but we cannot always depend on it.^' 
(The Constitution represents one institution by which the people decide, in 
advance, what they are not allowed to desire.'*^) For all his attention to the 
doctrine of interest rightly understood, and his insistence that people must 
be educated to its tenets, Tocqueville does not expect reason alone to clar-
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ify democracy's ^sion and forge its morals. Reason requires the additional 
influence of moderate habituation and the restraint provided by organized 
temper people's desires and help to enlarge their perspec­
tives^ Together with these supporting influences, self-interest well under­
stood may not put reason in the seat of power but may make passions and 
interests more reasonable.^**
Here women enter the picture again. If democracies tend toward my­
opia—constantly in need of moderation and religiously based restraint— 
democratic women can bring a corrective perspective. Tocqueville repeat­
edly highlights women's clear vision:
. before she has entirely left childhood she already thinks for herself, speaks 
freely, and alone; the great piaure of the world is constantly exposed be­
fore her; far from seeking to conceal the view of it from her, they uncover more 
and more of it to her regard every day and teach her to consider it with a firm 
and tranquil eye. Thus the vices and perils that society presents are not slow to 
be revealed to her; she sees them clearly, judges them without illusion, and 
563) ‘s full of confidence in her strength.. . . (DA,
Seeing dearly the risks, rewards, and requirements of life in a democracy 
Tocqueville s young women are bold but not too bold. "[Ijn the very midst 
of the independence of her first youth," he writes, "the American woman 
never entirely ceases to be mistress of herself; she enjoys all permitted plea­
sures without abandoning herself to any of them, and her reason does not 
drop the reins although it often seems to let them dangle" (DA, 564). These 
women are no shrinking violets, and they contribute their own energies to 
the democratic engine. Tocqueville's women shape democracy's mores— 
which limit the uses to which its energies can be put-and face reversals of 
fortune mth strength of will," "courage," and "tranquil and indomitable 
energy (DA, 566-67).
'^is is not to say that Tocqueville envisions women holding public office 
and directing the commonwealth with their judgment and candor. Rather 
he sees them cloistered" in the domestic circle, exerting a salutary influence 
behind the scenes. Tlie point that 1 wish to stress is that for Tocqueville 
long-term perspective, stable mores, and educated moderation are vital in^ 
lluences on democratic energy: "republicans in the United States ... profess 
the opinion that a people ought to be moral, religious, and moderate to the 
degree it is free" {DA, 379). Tocqueville happens to associate the influences 
of morality, religion, and moderation with women, so in his "new political 
science the feminine complements the masculine. But even if one were to 
contest his identification of those influences with women, his prescription 
for democratic health—his insistence that those influences be present— 
would remain just as cogent.
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Moderation and restraint are seldom aligned with nobility and greatness, 
as Tocqueville occasionally laments. Nonetheless, democracy's special ex­
cellence resides in its potential for facilitating widespread freedom—the 
freedom to invest time, energy, and attention as individuals see fit. But to 
fulfill that potential, citizens must invest attention and energy not only 
freely but wisely, with an eye toward sustainability and long-term conse­
quences. Otherwise, conditions of maximal freedom can produce condi­
tions in which that freedom disappears for "by demanding too much free­
dom one gets too much slavery.
ATTENTION
Every regime's ruling element must attend to political affairs. Without po­
litical attention; colleaive problems and public interests would go without 
redress. Encroachments against liberty would proceed unchecked. And yet 
in modem times, representative democracy has become virtually synony­
mous with delegated political attention. Citizens elect representatives to 
look after political affairs and turn their own attention to other pursuits. 
Tocqueville fears that energy will accompany attention in the headlong 
flight from political affairs and self-government. In his understanding—and 
this is extremely important if we are to grasp Tocqueville's "new political sci­
ence"—energy generally follows attention. If a subject does not hold peo­
ple's attention it will not enduringly attract their energy and activity. If the 
people's attention, and hence energy and activity, leave the political realm 
altogether, they are left with a government that "monopolizes movement 
and existence to such a point that everything around it must languish when 
it languishes . . ." (DA, 88).
Tocqueville considers whether attention might follow reason or rational 
self-interest—in other words, whether people tend to pay attention to issues 
and activities that affect their long-term interests as well as short-term de­
sires. Unfortunately for democracy and political engagement, attention is 
largely a function of tastes—and while tastes can be educated by reason and 
shaped by moral values those educative influences have their limits.'**’ In 
most instances attention follows tastes, and energy follows attention.^^ A 
taste for freedom might direct attention and energy to self-government, but 
a passion for material well-being, leisure, or for being left alone may divert 
democracy's resources {and influence its political health) in a different di- 
reaion altogether.^® Tocqueville implies that people can only be engaged 
with—that is, active in and attentive to—a limited number of issues or con­
cerns. He finds Americans to be completely consumed by their activities, 
saying that "not only are (Americans] occupied, but they have a passion for 
their occupations. They are perpetually in action, and each of their actions
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absorbs their soul; the fire they put into affairs prevents them from being 
inflamed by ideas" (DA, 614). Because of their many dislraaions they do 
not even pay much heed to respected leaders and officials: "when one has 
acquired the confidence of a democratic people, it is still a great affair to get 
its attention [d'obtenir son attention]" (DA, 614). Political affairs must com­
pete with commerce, entertainment, and the pleasures of private life for the 
scarce resources of attention and energy. To attract attention and energy 
they must appeal to people's tastes. As early as 1832, then, Tocqueville 
warns that we should not be surprised to see politics-as-spectacle:
When he has been drawn out of himself, he therefore always expeas that he is 
going to be offered some enormous objea to look at, and it is only at this price 
that he consents to tear himself for a moment from the small, complicated 
cares that agitate and charm his life. (DA, 464)
Commerce gives politics stiff competition for citizens' limited attention 
and energy. Commerce appeals not only to Americans' taste for material 
goods but for the impassioned aaivity that is sometimes associated with 
politics. "In democracies there is nothing greater nor more brilliant than 
commerce," Tocqueville writes, "it is what attracts the regard of the public 
and fills the imagination of the crowd; all energetic passions are direaed to­
ward it."'’® The danger is apparent, namely that commerce or other "bril­
liant" involvements may charm popular attention away from involvement 
with self-government, even though the latter channels, pools, and mingles 
people's energies, upholds democratic freedom, and hence enables pursuit 
of commerce in the first place.
In special instances politics may outpace its competitors. Political crises, 
for instance, can focus citizens' attention on political affairs. But as soon as 
the trouble has passed, attention and energy wander after tastes once again. 
Further, the focusing effect of crises is not only impermanent but also in­
determinate. Crisis can focus attention and energy on self-government and 
the common defense, but can just as easily disperse them.^^ Tocqueville 
writes of the American Revolution and aftermath:
It was this very prosperity that began to make people lose sight of the cause 
that had produced it; the danger having passed, Americans no longer found in 
themselves the energy and patriotism that had helped to ward it off. Delivered 
from the fears that had preoccupied them, they readily reverted to the ordinary 
tendency of their penchants. (DA, 371)
For all these reasons Tocqueville fears that democratic citizens will always 
struggle to focus their attention on political affairs, and hence will always 
be at risk of a political energy crisis.
When citizens withdraw their attention and energy from public and collec­
tive affairs they court a condition that Tocqueville calls isolation, a condition
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that can encourage the warped perspective of individualism (and ultimately 
egoism]. And in spite of his current fame as a civil society enthusiast, Toc- 
queville is much more concerned with avoiding radical isolation and indi­
vidualism than with promoting unlimited associationism and community. 
Political associations and social togetherness have their downsides, the for­
mer potentially undermining political order and the latter potentially 
quashing free thought and expression. Political engagement is not guaran­
teed to teach the art of ruling well. Township government is inefficient and 
messy, and in pre-revolutionary France associations contributed to a thor­
oughly un-civic culture. But while political engagement brings uncertain re­
wards, widespread political disengagement almost certainly undermines po­
litical capacities and self-government. We need look no further than the 
eighteenth<entury French intellectuals who lacked any exposure to aaive 
engagement, and who viewed politics from an "almost infinite distance 
from practice" (Oi?, 197). Their fellow citizens, had no "daily involve[ment] 
in regional administration," and hence were susceptible to the extraordi­
narily bad political advice, the "contempt for existing facts," that French in­
tellectuals offered them (OR, 195-202). Tocqueville suggests that the 
French Revolution's excesses were due in no small measure to the debili­
tated political perspective resulting from widespread political disengage-
ment. « j r
Political energy suffers as well as political and moral perspective. By dei- 
inition, isolated citizens withdraw their energy and attention from public 
affairs. Tocqueville wonies that isolated energies may not only stagnate but 
diminish. As we saw earlier, Tocqueville suggests that in the absence of con­
tinual agitation and progress, energy tends toward disuse and atrophy. En­
ergy responds with special ardor to circumstances that allow for personal 
disUnction, but isolated individuals are out of the game. Energy unused be­
comes energy squandered, at both the individual and the collective level.
If citizens continue to confine themselves more and more narrowly in the cir­
cle of small domestic interests, there to become agitated without rest, one can 
apprehend that in the end they will become almost inaccessible to those great 
and powerful public emotions that trouble peoples, but develop and renew 
them. (DA, 616)
Tocqueville worries not simply that people will fail to exercise the great and 
powerful public emotions" that stir them, but that, through this inactivity, 
the rousing force may become "practically out of reach even if the people 
want or need them. "Ambition may lose both its spark and its greatness, 
base materialism may "loosen the springs of action, and an enervated peo­
ple may lose the ability even to maintain its independence, let alone ac­
complish anything of lasting importances^
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The conditions of social equality promote political disengagement in the 
form of individualism and isolation. Equality "tends to isolate [men] from 
one another and to bring each of them to be occupied with himself 
alone.But equality also "lays open their souls excessively to the love of 
material enjoyments," and materialism is Tocqueville's fourth great concern 
for sustainable self-government (DA, 419). Under conditions of social 
equality most individuals could never hope to achieve fame or political 
power. But wealth and material pleasures are available to many, and thus 
conditions of social equality encourage pursuit of worldly goods: "The 
same causes that render citizens independent of one another push them 
every day toward new and restive desires and spur them constantly" (DA, 
607).53
Materialism, in turn, can increase citizens' isolation. We seek privacy in 
which to enjoy the fruits of our labor, and the experience of private enjoy­
ment sharpens our desires. "[Tjhese objects are small," Tocqueville says, 
"but the soul clings to them: it considers them every day and from very 
close; in the end they hide the rest of the world from it, and they sometimes 
come to place themselves between it and God" (DA, 509). In American and 
also French democracy he laments the increasing "desire to enrich oneself 
at any price, the preference for business, the love of profit, the search for 
material pleasure and comfort. ..." These "most widespread desires" often 
"occupy men's minds and turn them away from public affairs ..." (OR, 87).
Materialism damages all three of the qualities that Tocqueville's new po­
litical science seeks to promote—perspective, energy, and attention. The 
"blind passion" for wealth perverts political perspective and self-interest 
well understood:
Preoccupied with the sole care of making a fortune, they no longer perceive the 
tight bond that unites the particular fortune of each of them to the prosperity 
of all. There is no need to tear from such citizens the rights they possess; they 
themselves willingly allow them to escape. The exercise of their political duties 
appears to them a distressing contretemps that distracts them from their in­
dustry. .. . These people believe they are following the doctrine of interest, but 
they have only a coarse idea of it, and to watch better over what they call their 
affairs, they neglea the principal one, which is to remain masters of themselves 
(DA, 515).
Material desires focus on immediate or imminent satisfactions while dem­
ocratic freedom requires long-term perspective on citizens' interests. Imme­
diate satisfactions are also easy pickings, and, because they do not require 
well-invested energy, a life of short-term gratification lets energy stagnate. 
Early in Demoaacf in America, in an apparently unimportant account of 
South Sea islands, Tocqueville foreshadows his concern with democracy's
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enervating materialism. In the tropical "enchanted places," where every­
thing "seemed prepared for the needs of man or calculated for his plea­
sures," Tocqueville identifies "a certain enervating influence that attached 
man to the present and rendered him careless of the future" (DA, 22). He 
reiterates similar worries throughout the following political analyses. Indi­
viduals absorbed with material pleasures are "more prone to become ener­
vated than debauched," and one finds at the collective level a kind of "hon­
est materialism that does not corrupt souls, but softens them and in the end 
quietly loosens all their tensions" (DA, 509).
For the time being, Tocqueville's Americans maintain their springs' taut­
ness by investing their energies in cooperative projects and thus looking af­
ter their own affairs (as far as possible). Tocqueville addresses three differ­
ent kinds of participation that modem scholarship often includes under the 
catch-all mbric of "civic engagement": township administration, political 
associations, «nd civil associations. In Tocqueville's eyes, they are particu­
larly desirable because they all attract and embody citizens' collective polit­
ical attention and energy. This differentiates them from aaivities such as 
voting, which some political scientists regard as the quintessential measure 
of political participation. For Tocqueville, political participation is good in­
sofar as it means that citizens' attention and energy are focused on their 
common affairs and the business of self-government. Were political partic­
ipation to consist primarily in periodic voting—even if most citizens par­
ticipated—Tocqueville would lament the declining habits and spirits of in­
dependence, as when he remarks that "citizens quit their state of 
dependence just long enough to choose their masters and then fall back 
into it" (DA, 693). Tocqueville's preference for political participation that 
directly involves citizens' energies in cooperative activities and self-govern­
ment speaks to the recent political science literature that highlights so- 
called voter ignorance. This literature questions whether citizens know 
enough about complex national politics to do more good than harm.^** Yet 
even if today's citizens truly are politically ignorant—and here I take no 
stance—it would not make Tocqueville's vision of demoaacy less feasible. 
Citizens participating directly in self-government and local administration 
do not exhibit die kinds of ignorance that some political scientists fear. Not 
only does direct participation in local affairs involve citizens' attention and 
energies in self-government to a far greater extent than periodic voting, but 
it puts those energies to a more efficacious use.
Tocqueville's chapter on American townships is probably the most 
commonly consulted section of his most famous book. Democracy in 
America. Nonetheless, scholars seldom cite more than a line or two from 
that chapter, and even less commonly do they situate it within the context 
of Tocqueville's larger project (which must also include the Old Regime). 
For those reasons it merits extensive consideration. Tocqueville lauds the
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township system because it provides incentives for self-serving men to be­
come public-serving citizens. Note: men and not women, because Toc- 
queville portrays the township's lures as specifically appealing to male 
ambitions and vanities.
The political engagement of township administration does not begin as 
public-spiritedness or virtue. Rather, Tocqueville describes nineteenth-cen­
tury Americans as what rational choice theorists might call "utility-maxi­
mizing" individuals, who turn their attention and energy to cooperative 
ventures when the individual benefits are obvious and the costs of partici­
pating are low.ss Desire and taste are the initial lures: "desire for esteem, the 
need of real interests, the taste for power and for attention" "excite men's 
interest" to the township's ample resources.^® The township is "the princi­
ple of public administration" in New England because it is "the hearth 
around which the interests and affections of men come to gather" (DA, 76). 
While Tocqueville observes that township government "is to [citizens'] taste 
as well as of their choice," in truth it is "of their choice" because it is suited 
to their tastes (DA, 65).
The existence of local resources provides only part of citizens' motiva­
tion to participate. Even prodigious rewards, if inaccessible, rarely excite 
people's attention or energy. For example, since federal offices and their 
significant power are extremely difficult to attain, "ambition cannot make 
them the permanent goal of its efforts" (DA, 64). The township's resources, 
however, are not only ample but readily available. The citizen sees the 
township as "a free and strong corporation that he is a part of and that is 
worth his trouble to seek to direct," and so a great number of people "ex­
ploit the power of the township for their profit and take interest in it for 
themselves" (DA, 64). To use the language of modern scholarship, town­
ship administration attracts citizens' attention and energies by convincing 
them of their "political efficacy.
Once the township's "advantages" have "excited men's interest" and "at- 
tractjed] the ambitious passions of the human heart," the average citizen 
places his ambition and his future" in township administration—invests 
his attention and energy—sharing there in decision and office (DA, 63-65). 
Earlier I noted Tocqueville's insistence that individual energies must be 
pooled, limited, and channeled toward useful ends. The township serves 
those purposes admirably. By appealing to the tastes and hence attracting 
the attention and energy of self-interested individuals, it embodies "inde­
pendence and power" and engenders "a continual, but at the same time 
peaceful, movement that agitates [society] without troubling it" (DA, 
63-65).
The initially selfish engagement holds transformative potential, because 
tastes can be shaped and perspective can be educated.The experience of 
cooperative engagement enlarges citizens' political perspective by drawing
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them outside of themselves and their narrow concerns. Those pursuing 
short-term resources come to realize that their long-term self-interest re­
quires continued political engagement: this is self-interest well understood. 
Even when people manage public affairs "very badly"—which is often the 
case, in Tocqueville's view—"the people cannot meddle in public affairs 
without having the scope of their ideas extended and without having their 
minds be seen to go outside their ordinary routine" (DA, 233). The citizen 
engaged with local government "finally assembles clear and practical ideas 
on the nature of his duties as well as the extent of his rights" (DA, 65).
The political engagement of township administration can set in motion 
a beneficial, self-reinforcing cycle (or "virtuous circle"). As citizens experi­
ence self-government and the pleasures of local freedom they develop a 
stronger taste for the same, and grow better equipped to identify encroach­
ments by hostile powers.^^ And as they treat "common problems in com­
mon," their tnitially self-involved perspectives often widen to include no­
tions of duty and reciprocal responsibility. The experience of 
self-government enlarges political competence as well as political perspec­
tive. Just as juries are schools for citizenship, "the institutions of a township 
are to freedom what primary schools are to science; they put it within reach 
of the people" because they "make them taste [freedom's] peaceful employ 
and habituate them to making use of it" (DA, 57). For Tocqueville, hands- 
on experience can teach political responsibility and the necessity of self- 
government in a uniquely powerful way, and townships provide a much 
more accessible venue than state or national governments. Thus, "in this re­
stricted sphere that is within his reach," the locally engaged citizen "tries to 
govern society" (DA, 65).
Nonetheless, local self-government is frequently inefficient and messy, al­
though in Tocqueville's view its benefits more than outweigh the costs. He 
compares efficient, centralized administration in France to American town­
ships "whose budgets are not drawn up on methodical and above all uni­
form plans," and sides strongly with the latter, saying that
1 see most of those French communes, whose accountancy is so perfea, 
plunged in a profound ignorance of their true interests and left in such an in­
vincible apathy that society seems rather to vegetate than to live in them; on 
the other hand, I perceive in those same American townships ... an enlight­
ened, aaive, enterprising population; ! contemplate a society always at work 
there. (DA, 87-88n)
France's centralized efficiency, which monopolizes administration, lacks 
each of the essential political goods that I have associated with political en­
gagement: political perspective ("ignorance of their true interests"), politi­
cal attention ("invincible apathy"), and political energy or motion ("rather
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to vegetate than to live"). America's messy townships, in which average cit­
izens administer common affairs, produce the opposite results despite their 
inefficiencies.
But as Tocqueville realizes, inefficient engagement is a hard sell with 
commercially oriented citizens, even if it promotes long-term self-interest. 
Much more likely is a rapid loss of patience with local governments' un­
tidiness and inefficiency for "the exercise of their political duties" may 
come to seem "a distressing contretemps that distracts them from their in­
dustry" (DA, 515). Impatience may lead citizens to delegate administration 
to an efficient, centralized power and precede a descent into soft despotism.
Tocqueville extends his analysis of associations beyond the "municipal 
freedoms" of township administration to include the attentive activity of 
political associations. While township administration constitutes formal 
government—an institution of the state—political associations are of pri­
vate origin, and "owe their birth and development only to individual will" 
(DA, 180). Tocqueville's political associations are thoroughly instrumental:
An association consists solely in the public adherence that a certain number of 
individuals give to such and such a doctrine, and in the engagement in which 
they contract to cooperate in a certain fashion to make it prevail. (DA, 181)
The motivation to associate has nothing to do with citizens' expressing an 
intrinsically political human nature or fulfilling their highest capacities, as 
civic republican theorists sometimes portray it. Rather, stated in mechanis­
tic terms, "the association gathers the efforts of divergent minds in a cluster 
and drives them vigorously toward a single goal clearly indicated by it" (DA, 
181).
Individually, political associations have any number of ends; categori­
cally, they serve one overarching purpose. Political associations are sites of 
resistance, those institutions "by which men seek to defend themselves 
against the despotic action of the majority or the encroachments of . . . 
power." While a citizen might join any particular political association to 
support a "specific doctrine," he or she learns there a more general "art of 
uniting with those like him to defend (his freedom]" at the very time when 
each has become "individually weaker" and "incapable in isolation of pre­
serving his freedom" (DA, 489). Political associations form a "dike . . . 
against tyranny" of the centralized government or an oppressive democratic 
majority (DA, 184). They aa analogously to powerful individuals in aristo­
cratic nations:
A political, industrial, commercial, or even scientific and literary association is 
an enlightened and powerful citizen whom one can neither bend at will nor 
oppress in the dark and who, in defending its particular rights against the exi­
gencies of power, saves common freedoms. (DA, 668)
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Tocqueville differentiates between those political associations with a social 
element and those whose bond is "purely intellectual," the latter apparently 
resembling what present-day scholars call "mailing list associations. 
Only in those political associations where members meet personally can 
ideas and opinions be "the force and heat that written thought can never at­
tain" (DA, 181).
Tocqueville also implies that many political associations, being funda­
mentally insular and partisan, do not promote moral virtues such as gener­
alized tolerance and mutual respect. Political associations can actually en­
courage moral disengagement because, as in France, sometimes members 
"profess the dogma of passive obedience" or make "the entire sacrifice of 
their judgment and their free will in a single stroke," and this "very much 
diminishes their moral force" (DA, 186). This is not to say that political as­
sociations ar^ immoral or amoral, or that political associations cannot in­
volve moral engagement. But in general they do not "enlarge the heart" in 
the manner of nonpolitical, and often nonpartisan, civil associations.
Indeed, Tocqueville only guardedly advocates freedom of political asso­
ciation. Political associations can promote democratic freedom, and for­
bidding them would harm associational life generally, but they bring prob­
lems along with benefits. Precisely because they are energetic and partisan 
sites of resistance, a bulwark against tyranny of the majority, they can also 
threaten stability and order. The degree of their utility depends on the larger 
societal context. Tocqueville finds political associations necessary and good 
in nineteenth-century America because Americans enjoy long-standing tra­
ditions of non-violent association and deliberation. Further, in America 
"opinions differ only by nuances" so violent stmggles are (in general) un­
common (DA, 185). France, conversely, lacks America's stable mores and 
traditions; there, political associations are viewed as catalysts to aaion and 
often violence, real threats to the political order. The political engagement 
of political associations may or may not support healthy democracy, de­
pending on a nation's prior resources and traditions. If nothing else, Toc- 
queville's observations should chasten those contemporary political scien­
tists who look to the American system as a model for developing 
democracies worldwide.
Too often, contemporary political scientists and political theorists treat 
membership in political and social associations under the single rubric of 
"civic engagement," as if it were all the same thing.®^ Tocqueville, con­
versely, takes pains to distinguish between political and civil associations, 
with the latter encompassing "the associations that are formed in civil life 
and which have an object that is in no way political" (DA, 489). Many con­
temporary civic engagement scholars insist that participation in nonpoliti­
cal organizations stimulates political involvement and interest.®^ TTigy sgj. 
dom realize that Tocqueville made that point first. He shows how civil
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associations can enlarge citizens' moral as well as political perspeaive by 
bringing people together, emphasizing their commonality, and demystify­
ing their differences. Civil associations are essential because "[s]entiments 
and ideas renew themselves, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is 
developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon one another" (DA, 
491). Once citizens learn the art of associating for civil purposes they may 
put it to political uses: "civil associations therefore facilitate political asso­
ciations; but on the other hand, political association singularly develops 
and perfects civil association" (DA, 496). However, civil associations can 
just as easily divert people's attention and energy from political involve- 
ment.^3 associations can stabilize society by developing
the art of association while balancing the agitation of political associations.
This much is clean both political and civil associations are extremely im­
portant for demoaacies' health. Political associations develop the art of self- 
governance, the love of liberty, and the ability to resist encroachments against 
it. Civil associations further promote the art of associating even as they divert 
some of society's copious energy away from immediate investment in politics, 
thus "keep[ing] society on the move" without excessive political agitation or 
instability. If pressed to choose between the two, however, Tocqueville comes 
down firmly on the civil side. Political associations are key contributors in cer­
tain kinds of demoaatic environments, namely democracies with long tradi­
tions of stable, constitutional government and rule of law. Yet in newly de­
mocratizing countries political associations may undermine stability and 
promote civil chaos. Moreover, both stable and developing democracies 
could probably survive the loss of their political associations for quite a while, 
although they would likely suffer in the long run. But no democracy could en­
dure the absence of civil associations' transmission of cooperative norms and 
social connectedness. Tocqueville fears for "the morality and intelligence of a 
democratic people" if government were to crowd out private associations, but 
not \f political associations were imperiled (DA, 491).
At any rate, in Tocqueville's United States both the political participation 
of township administration and political associations, and the social en­
gagement of civil associations (which reciprocally reinforces political par­
ticipation), keep citizens' attention and energy focused on self-government. 
The perspective of self-interest well understood steers people toward that 
productive engagement and away from the corrosive individualism and iso­
lation that can undermine democratic freedom. For these reasons American 
democracy resists, for the time being, the corrosive influences that Toc­
queville glimpses more fully in his native France. Nonetheless, Tocqueville 
can only muster muted optimism about democracy in America, and even 
less than that about democracy in Europe. For all its merits, American de­
mocracy seems to represent an unstable equilibrium that might easily be 
tilted toward excessive inattention, enervation, and disengagement. Why?
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First, the township sj^tem that earns Tocqueville's praise comprised only 
a fraction of American democracy. Tocqueville himself admits that "one 
must not extend indiscriminately to the whole Union what 1 say about New 
England" regarding public education and civic perspective (DA, 289). In 
Southern slaveholding states and in the sparsely populated Western territo­
ries he finds little of New England's established civic habits and tastes, fo­
cused political attention, and usefully channeled energies.*^** Indeed, in 
slaveholding Kentucky, the average citizen "has the tastes of idle men," and 
since attention and energy follow tastes "he pursues fortune less than agi­
tation and pleasure, and he applies in this direction the energy that his 
neighbor [in free Ohio] deploys elsewhere . . (DA, 333). Further, Amer­
ica's West represents "democracy reaching its furthest limit," with few social 
networks and no civic traditions. “The new states of the West already have 
inhabitants" but "society does not yet exist there" (DA, 50). Thus while 
many present-day political scientists quote only a few enthusiastic passages 
from Democracy in America praising Americans' public-spiritedness and po­
litical engagement, they do not capture the entire picture.
Second, even the civic-minded regions such as New England are marked 
by intense dedication to commerce and material gain. Excessive love of 
those pursuits threatens to crowd out civic attention and absorb all avail­
able energy, regardless of the religious influences that can sometimes keep 
materialism in check. In spite of civic traditions and norms of cooperation, 
if people love their private pursuits sufficiently they always flirt with the 
temptation to delegate public business to a professional bureaucracy and 
withdraw into their individual worlds.
Finally, tastes change. Tocqueville's Americans exhibit a strong taste for 
public life and political engagement. 'They find it a pleasurable diversion:
To meddle in the government of society and to speak about it is the greatest 
business and, so to speak, the only pleasure that an American knows . . . 
women themselves often go to political assemblies and, by listening to politi­
cal discourses, take a rest from household tedium. For them, clubs replace the­
ater-going to a certain point. (DA, 232)^®
Elsewhere, Tocqueville tells us that "there are still only a few [Americans] 
who go [to the theater]" (DA, 468). We are left to wonder whether Ameri­
cans' civic attention is likely to survive once theater-going catches up with 
clubs and political assemblies in popular esteem and entertainment value.®® 
Do popular tastes comprise a sufficient hook on which to hang one's hopes 
for enduring, widespread civic attention and ensuing civic artivity? The an­
swer is discouraging. In great detail Tocqueville chronicles the fickleness of 
popular tastes,®^ and we can surmise that while at the time of his writing 
Americans comprised a remarkably engaged citizenry—both active in and 
attentive to treating "common problems in common"—he does not expect 
their tastes, attention, and hence energies to seek out public affairs forever:
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Not only do they (demoaatic citizens] not naturally have the taste to occupy 
themselves with the public, but often they lack the time to do it. Private life is 
so active in democratic times, so agitated, so filled with desires and work, that 
hardly any energy or leisure remains to each man for political life. (DA, 643)
In American democracy Tocqueville observes a relentless activity ("men 
never stay still") encouraged by the relatively new, and sometimes over­
whelming, impact of free choice and independence. Able to choose their 
occupations, business, and leisure pursuits Americans become jacks of 
many trades but masters of nonets While political power or lasting fame 
may be out of the question, myriad material goods are not. The American 
"therefore does all things in haste," and "he insists on knowing very quickly 
rather than on knowing well" (DA, 584).
Of course, these limitations apply to politics as well as business and 
leisure pursuits. While Tocqueville famously praises Americans' political 
participation, few scholars acknowledge this biting accompaniment: "their 
actions are often ill-considered because they give but little time and atten­
tion to each matter." In faa, with remarkable prescience Tocqueville de­
scribes something like what we now call "information overload," or the 
"sort of ignorance that is bom of extreme publicity ... in demoaatic na­
tions (people) often aa at random because one wanted to say everything to 
them." Because attention is limited but political information is vast, "the 
principal features of each piaure disappear for the latter among the multi­
tude of details (DA, 583). Tocqueville depicts a manic pace and shallow 
depth of daily life that could just as easily apply to today's society, and he 
closes with the powerful but little-known pronouncement that "[t]he habit 
of inattention ought to be considered the greatest vice of the democratic 
mind" (DA, 584). Since Tocqueville strongly suggests that energy follows at­
tention, political inattention threatens political lethargy.
Thus, Tocqueville views the United States not as a model polity that will 
show the world how to avoid demoaacy's perils but rather as an impressive 
but unstable balancing act. It stands in a tenuous equilibrium maintained 
(for the moment) by an interplay of culture, ideology, tastes, habits, and po­
litical institutions, all of which can change and hence upset the civic bal­
ance. Indeed, nine years after his initial visit to America Tocqueville ends 
volume II with the very same worries that had inaugurated volume I: lack 
of political attention, which he calls the "general apathy"; and a generalized 
enervation that could lead future democracies into despotism or anarchy. 
He writes,
Both (license or tyranny, anarchy or despotism) are equally to be feared, and 
can as easily issue from one and the same cause, which is general apathy, the 
fruit of individualism ... What it is important to combat is therefore much less 
anarchy or despotism than the apathy that can create the one or the other al­
most indifferently. (DA, 704)®^
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The soft despotism of a "schoolmaster" government "hinders, restrains, en­
ervates, stifles, and stultifies" inattentive individualists. So in spite of Amer­
ican democracy's countervailing forces, the continual pull of individualism 
and isolation gives Tocqueville concern for its future prospects.^°
Almost two centuries later, a glance at present-day political science schol­
arship shows these same worries hard at work. We are told that political par­
ticipation and "social capital" are declining and that democracy might suf­
fer as a consequence, with the apparent presumption that we were once 
better off.^^ But Tocqueville helps us to understand that democracy has long 
struggled—and perhaps always will stmggle—with the amount of energy 
that citizens dedicate to self-government and cooperative endeavors. In­
deed, Tocqueville's concept of "energy" (and his concern about its supply) 
lays the ground for Robert Putnam's influential writings on "social capital." 
At the individual level, energy is the most important ingredient of what 
economists and sociologists call "human capital.Collective energy com­
prises a significant component of "social capital," the accumulation of in­
terpersonal connections that facilitate collective action. For Tocqueville, in­
dividual and collective energy can serve non-political functions, yet when 
necessary they can be channeled into political institutions and the 
processes of self-government. But the metaphor of "energy" has an added 
advantage over "capital" for helping us to think about democracy's health 
because we can apply it to governments as well as to individuals and 
groups. Democracy requires an energetic citizenry but also an energetic gov­
ernment. Without the latter, democracy would fall to internal crises or ex­
ternal enemies; without the former, citizens would be at their government's 
mercy. The same point is not so easily made using the "capital" metaphor.
Tocqueville's new political science also teaches us that energy and atten­
tion must be encouraged, limited, and channeled toward various coopera­
tive projects, and sometimes toward self-government, but that a soft or fem­
inine touch may elicit better results than forceful coercion. In our current 
mania to stem die tide of political apathy among the young, many middle 
schools and high schools are requiring so-called civic engagement from their 
students.^^ Tocqueville supplies reasons to doubt the programs' efficacy if 
not their sincerity, because they seek to attract energy and attention without 
"the free concurrence of (students'] wills." Because "man is so made that he 
prefers standing still to marching without independence toward a goal of 
which he is ignorant," such mandatory measures could, "without perceiv­
ing it, [drive] away the objea of [their] covetousness . .." (DA, 515, 87). If 
we take Tocqueville seriously we must take citizens' tastes seriously as well, 
because quite often attention follows tastes (and energy follows attention). 
Rather than coercing attention and energy we can attempt to attract them to 
cooperative pursuits, including self-government, by appealing to people's 
tastes. The trick, of course, is to make politics appealing but not tawdry or
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shallow to the point of meaninglessness. We might also provide greater in­
centives for satisfying participation, delegating more power to localities and 
hence helping local politics appeal to the "ambitious passions of the hu­
man heart" (DA, 64). And aside from eliciting additional attention and en­
ergy to politics and self-government, we might revise our political institu­
tions so that they utilize and channel existing political attention and energy 
more efficaciously. The energy need not be manly or womanly as long as it 
is potent, pooled, and convertible into cooperative political activism or re­
sistance when the need arises.
Finally, if we take Tocqueville seriously we must take not only masculine 
but also feminine traits seriously as political virtues. Restraint, judgment, 
and respect for appropriate limitations, along with understated mastery that 
guides rather than dominates—all of which Tocqueville associates with 
women—might serve the home and hearth quite well, but we omit them 
from political life at our peril. Democracy without energy faces impotence 
and irrelevance at best, and submission to despotic masters at worst. But en­
ergetic democracy without restraint and judgment could end the world with 
a bang, not a whimper.^'* As noted earlier, I am not making the ambitious 
claim that all citizens must combine masculine and feminine virtues within 
themselves; that might be asking for the impossible or even the inadvisable. 
Metrosexual manliness characterizes the combinations that political science 
must effect within, and apply to, society as a whole. Tocqueville's democ­
racy requires feminine as well as masculine virtues, and well-channeled en­
ergy from anyone who can provide it.
CONCLUSION
Earlier I offered two justifications for my titular term, "metrosexual manli­
ness." Upon reflection I should add a third: its potentially controversial ve­
neer might attract readers' attention to deeper points underneath. Harvey 
Mansfield has taught many of us about the value of getting attention, at 
least those of us who have cared to reflect on his words. Teachers must be 
able to reach a wide range of students, conveying knowledge and tech­
niques that everyone should possess, and then, with students whose tastes, 
habits, and abilities prompt deeper reflection, giving those few what they 
deserve as well. Metrosexual manliness is a silly concept that contains se­
rious ideas. Democracy needs more energy, toughness, and moral courage, 
as well as more humanity, moderation, and moral restraint from its men 
and women. Which situations require which traits? From whom should we 
expect them? How will we elicit them? Answering those questions is the 
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